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STATEMENT OP ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the decision of the lower court to preceed to 
hear the Motion for Summary Judgment on November 16, 1984 
notwithstanding pending and incomplete discovery, was prejudiced 
and an abuse of discretion. 
2. Whether facts alleged by Plaintiff's affidavit and 
deposition cited in opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
raised issues of fact when reviewed most favorably to Plaintiff. 
3. Whether the Summary Judgment dated the day of 
1985 should be set aside and the case remanded for 
trial. 
Plaintiff seeks to have the Summary Judgment set aside and 
the case remanded for trial. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Yurth (President of Plaintiff) held discussions with Mr. 
Horman who eventually allowed Mr. Yurth to use vacant office 
space on the second floor of the Keith Warshaw Building, or the 
old Kress Building as it was historically known, to begin 
promotion of the Downtown Athletic Club. (Yurth deposition, 
pp.77, 78 & 79) On May 8, 1981, the Plaintiff and Defendant S. 
M. Horman & Sons Co. executed a written instrument entitled 
"Construction and Lease Agreement for the Downtown Athletic 
Club." (Exhibit 11, Yurth deposition.) This instrument 
incorporated the prior understanding that Plaintiff could utilize 
office space in the old Kress Building for payment of one dollar 
per month rent. (Paragraph V A, pp. 3-4, Exhibit 11 to Yurth 
deposition.) 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a modification of 
the Construction and Lease Agreement by including therein an 
agreement to assign the Defendant's underlying lease in the 
Harver warehouse. While Plaintiff was continuing to expend 
funds, accepts bids, draft plans, sell memberships and seek 
financing in the proposed club, Defendant served notice on the 
Plaintiff to quit the premises. Plaintiff filed the lawsuit to 
protect his rights in the contract. 
3. The Construction and Lease Agreement was executed by the 
parties on or about May 8, 1981, and included, among others, the 
following material conditions and requirements: 
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a. For occupancy "of the office space" in the Kress 
Building, the Plaintiff was required to pay rent of One Dollar 
per month. (Paragraph V A, p. 3, of the Construction and Lease 
Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition; Yurth deposition, p. 
77; Horman deposition, p. 193. ) 
b. The improvements] to be made by Defendant S. M. 
Horman & Sons Co. under that agreement were to be made only 
"provided that the Harver Building can be reinforced at a price 
that is acceptable to Lessor [Defendant] and Lessee [Plaintiff], 
and in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of the Salt 
Lake City Building Department." (Paragraph III A, p. 2 of the 
Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition; 
Yurth deposition, p. 159. ) 
c. Construction by Defendant S. M. Horman & Sons Co. 
was to commence only after "confirmed receipt and acceptance by 
Lessor [Defendant] of construction financing acceptable to Lessor 
[Defendant]," and the entire lease was specifically "subject to 
Lessor [Defendant] being able to secure sufficient financing. 
Lessee [Plaintiff] would pay any interest in excess of 12%. 
(Paragraphs IV and VI F, pp. 3, 5, of the Construction and Lease 
Agreement, Exhibit 11 to Yurth deposition.) 
d. Lessor [Defendant] was required to proceed with 
construction under the agreement only if the Plaintiff "shall 
sell a sufficient number of memberships...to guarantee that 
payments required by this contract will be paid" (Paragraph IV, 
p. 3, of the Construction and Lease Agreement, Exhibit 11 to 
Yurth deposition.) 
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e. Lessee [Plaintiff] was required "to assign dues 
income in a sufficient amount to guarantee said payments 
according to individual membership contracts by contract number 
to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments due and payable under this lease." (Paragraph IV, 
p. 3, of the Construction and Lease Agreement, (Exhibit 11 to 
Yurth deposition; Yurth deposition, p. 83.)) 
4. Up through June 7, 1983, the Defendants did not object 
to nor seek to terminate the Construction and Lease Agreement. 
Defendant was receiving benefits in the protection of the 
property; lower insurance rates and protection against 
vandalism. (Yurth Affidavit). 
5. Plaintiffs learned in November, 1983, that the Defendant 
had entered into a contract with Salt Lake Aquisition Group for 
sale of the property. In order to sell it would be necessary to 
terminate the Construction and Lease Agreement - hence the notice 
to quit. 
6. A record of the contract with ScLlt Lake Acquisition 
Group was filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office 
effectively making financing impossible. 
7. Defendant had noticed up its motion for summary judgment 
to be heard at 8:30 A.M. on November 16, 1984. (R. 387) 
8. Present counsel was retained only 24 hours prior to the 
hearing (R. 388) 
9. Counsel filed a petition for extraoridinary review and 
request for additional time to respond to and argue in opposition 
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to motion for summary judgment. (R. 387) That motion was denied. 
However, the court gave leave to file a memorandum within 20 
days. (R. 386) 
10. Defendant in support of summary judgment cited 
affidavits of Brent R. Dyer (R. 285)f George J. Throckmorton (R. 
311), L. R. Gardiner Jr. (R. 402), Scott R. Evans (R. 290 )f 
Sherman Gilman (R. 319), Steven D, Petersen (R. 297). Further, 
the deposition of Sidney Horman was extensively cited. 
11. Many of the persons named were complete strangers to the 
Plaintiff and Plaintiff desired to take their depositions. 
12. Upon receipt of notice of deposition of Sidney Horman 
[Defendant]f Defendant's counsel responded saying: 
With respect to the depositions you have noticed, it is 
my understanding of the Judge's ruling that any further 
discovery necessarily awaits his ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment. Should that motion be granted, 
there would, of course, be no further discovery. If the 
motion should be deniedf I shall be pleased to cooperate 
with you in setting dates. (Your notices conflict with 
other depositions previously scheduled by me, and I 
would not be able to accomodate you on those dates in 
any event.)(R. 434) 
13. Plaintiff submitted an affidavit in support of its 
motion for extraordinary review.(R. 570) Said affidavit (R. 576) 
alleged the need to take the deposition of nine persons. Notices 
of deposition were served on Roger Evans, Bill Selvig, Mike 
Citiwood, William Oswald and Sid Horman.(R. 579, R. 581 through 
R. 587) 
Defendant would not make himself available for deposition as 
is shown above. 
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14. In Defendants1 supporting affidavits, Defendant alleges 
that there were conditions precedent necessary to the validity of 
the contract and that the conditions precedent had not been 
performed. 
The facts that Defendant relies on were: 
a. The Plaintiff did not pay the one dollar per month 
rental required for the temporary occupancy of Kress Building 
office space. (Horman deposition, p. 140.) 
b. The purported receipt (R. 310) for monthly rent of the 
temporary facility supposedly signed by Defendant S. M., Horman, 
as agent for S. M. Horman & Sons Co., filed with this Court by 
the Plaintiff in support of its "Motion for Court to Fix Amount 
of Counter Bond," was forged by the Plaintiff and was not signed 
by Mr. Horman. (Affidavit of George J. Throckmorton; Horman 
deposition, p. 186.) 
Response. Response to a. & b. see receipt attached to 
Throckmorton affidavit, David Yurth affidavit (R. 455 paragraph 
12) See Addendum. David Yurth categorically affirmed that the 
payment was made. 
Q. Now, at that time as I get the picture from this 
thing, you paid Mr. Horman in advance $100 as advance 
rent for that; is that correct? 
A. That was what I said I would do and that is what I 
did. 
Q. Okay. And was this — I don't know tha nature of 
this, but was this supposed to be a receipt from him? 
A. I drafted this speed memo and took it in with $100 
and left it on his secretary's desk with a message that 
this is what we agreed to do and I went back in the 
subsequent day and got my copy that had been signed and 
took it with me and put it in the record. 
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Note - Plaintiff has not had an opportunity to depose 
Throckmorton. David Yurth denies that the document is a forgery. 
c. The Harver Building could not be reinforced at a price 
acceptable to the Lessor [Defendant]. (Horman deposition, p. 
152; Yurth deposition, p. 194. ) 
d. The only engineering studies performed with respect to 
which any report was given showed that the Harver Building could 
not be made structurally sound economically for the intended 
purpose. (Yurth deposition, pp. 165-167 and 194.) 
e. No written engineering studies or completed drawings 
providing for adequate structural reinforcement of the Harver 
Building were submitted to or approved any plans for this 
building. (Affidavit of Scott R. Evans, Assistant Director of 
the Department of Building and Housing Services for Salt Lake 
City Corporation). 
Response. Response to c, d & e: Yurth Deposition 167, 168. 
A. Bill Smith was of the opinion that — and expressed 
his opinion openly to me in meetings with Sidney and in 
meetings that I had with him on the building that it 
could not be used in its current state and that it would 
have to be reinforced by a steel reinforcing system and 
and it was going to cost $150,000 a floor and so on. 
When that representation was first made to me, it 
was a cause of considerable concern and it was the 
reason why we engaged Bonneville Engineering in the 
first place. It was subsequently established by virtue 
of the meetings which I had with Mr. Smith and with Mr. 
Talbot and conversations which were had between my 
architects and Mr. Talbot had not conducted that study 
nor produced the results of that study entirely on his 
own or with entire objectivity and it was my contention 
then and it is still my contention that the results of 
the study were purposely skewed to show that there was 
more structural reinforcement needed and more cost to be 
required than we could absorb in our construction so 
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that the Construction and Lease Agreement would never 
result in the thing being built. (Yurth Affidavit 
paragraphs 7, 8 & 9 (R. 453, 454) 
The affidavit of Scott Evans outlines the engineering work 
which was performed. Plaintiff and Scott Evans believe it to 
have been adequate for the purposes of the contract. See 
Addendum. (R. 474-477) 
f. The Defendant (Lessor) did not receive or accept 
construction financing acceptable to the Lessor [Defendant]. 
(Horman deposition, pp. 125-126. ) 
Response. The Agreement itself in paragraph VI provides 
that interest in excess of 12% will be paid by Lessee 
[Plaintiff]. See paragraph VI. F. of Construction and Lease 
Agreement. Addendum. See Yurth affidavit. (R. 453 paragraphs 7, 
R. 454 paragraph 11, R. 457 paragraph 17, R. 458 paragraph 18, R. 
459 paragraph 21, R. 462 paragraph 30) also affidavit of Rudy 
Curinga (R. 464-468). 
g. Neither Defendant nor Plaintiff was able to secure 
sufficient financing at a rate not to exceed 12% per annum. 
(Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 227, 229, 233, 235, 239, 240, 
254; Horman deposition, p. 74). 
Response. Defendant misquotes the contract. 12% or more 
financing is not prohibited by the Agreement. It receives 
special attention - (Interest in excess of 12% is to be paid by 
Lessee [Plaintiff]). Also see citations related to (f.). 
Plaintiff was working on financing when Defendant unilaterally 
recorded a contract of sale. 
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h. Plaintiff did not at any time assign dues income in 
sufficient amount, or any amount whatever, according to 
individual contract member or any other manner to a special 
account designated solely for the payment of lease properties. 
(Yurth deposition, pp. 82 & 84; Horman deposition, pp. 90-91, 
181-183.) 
Response. A substantial number of memberships were sold and 
a trust agreement sent to Defendant. Defendant did not sign 
agreement for deposit. (Yurth deposition 117.) 
Q. The document you said was prepared in order to 
assign the membership contract to payment of lease 
payment into an escrow account and so forth, you said 
you had a copy of that document? 
A. Yes, sir, I do. 
Q. When did you present that to Mr. Horman? Did I 
understand you to say that you gave that to Mr. Horman? 
A. Yes, sir. 
a. The oral agreement to assign which is alleged by the 
Plaintiff included as a material condition precedent to any 
assignment the condition that the lessors (the owners of the 
property) absolutely and completely release the Defendant from 
all obligations under the lease and accept the proposed assignee 
as the new lessee in place of Defendant. (Paragraph 4 of section 
1, Exhibit 15 to Yurth deposition; Horman deposition, pp. 114, 
175, 195; Affidavit of Brent Dyer.) 
Response. Yurth deposition page 198 
A. Yes. He indicated that he was uneasy about it but 
that he did say to Mr. Dyer that he had the ability to 
assign the lease and that he opened the document and 
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showed Brent Dyer the specific portions of the document 
which enabled him to assign that lease, 
Q. If he could be made comfortable financially? 
Yurth affidavit (R. 456 paragraphs 14 & 15 also Clissold 
affidavit, R. 498 paragraphs 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). (See Addendum) 
b. The lessors (owners) of the Harver Building did not 
release the Defendant from any obligation under the lease or 
accept the Plaintiff as a new lessee in place of the Defendant. 
(Horman deposition, p. 119. ) 
Response. The same citations in response to (a.). 
c. A material condition precedent to any assignment of the 
master lease required as a condition precedent to construction 
the approval by the City of engineering studies. (Yurth 
deposition, p. 192; paragraph (2)1, Exhibit 15 to Yurth 
deposition.) The engineering studies have never been completed 
and sent to the City for approval. (Affidavit of Scott Evans.) 
d. A material condition precedent to any assignment was for 
the assignee to get adequate financing (Yurth deposition, p. 
192), which was never provided. (Yurth deposition, pp. 207, 224, 
229, 233, 235, 239, 240 and 254; Affidavit of Sherman Gilman, 
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Compciny, Inc. ) 
Response. Responses to c. & d. are the same responses 
raised in response to Point II. 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFF, THROUGH COUNSEL, WAS NOT GIVEN THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY TO ADEQUATELY 
RESPOND TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVITS OF FACT 
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Thusf Plaintiff was told that Plaintiff could not do 
discovery necessary to Respond to the summary judgment motion 
until after the decision was entered. The affidavits were 
clearly created by Defendant to support its case. Plaintiff had 
no opportunity to conduct discovery related to the alleged facts. 
The case is complicated and has resulted in voluminous pleadings. 
(Defendant's counsel even apologizes for length of his brief. (R. 
323)) 
Plaintiff requested time and the opportunity to conduct 
further discovery. Such request was denied, and the conducting 
of additional discovery would not have prejudiced Defendant. The 
result was that all of the facts were not and are not on the 
table. 
In a similar fact situation, Auerbachs v. Kimball, Supreme 
Court, State of Utah, November 15, 1977, 572 P.2d 376, the Court 
The granting of the motion for summary judgment was 
premature, because Kimball's discovery was not then 
complete. It was the information sought in the 
proceedings for discovery, which Kimball claimed would 
infuse the issues with facts sufficient to defeat a 
motion for summary judgment, and sustain his counter-
claim. Whether such would be the case can not now be 
determined, because such facts, if they exist were not 
allowed to be discovered. 
When a motion is made opposing summary judgment, on the 
ground discovery has not been completed, the court 
should grant a continuance or deny the motion for 
summary judgment; unless the motion in opposition is 
deemed dilatory or without merit. If the motion for 
summary judgment is denied, the denial should be without 
prejudice to its renewal; after an elapse of adequate 
time for completion of discovery. 
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It would not greatly have delayed the proceedings to have 
allowed the discovery. 
The Court in Cox v. Winters 678 P.2d 311 (Utah, 1984) stated 
Trial court abused its descretion in denying investors 
opportunity to conduct further discovery prior to 
granting attorney's motion for summary judgment... 
It is axiomatic that a summary judgment ought not to be 
granted if all facts cannot be placed before the court. 
POINT II 
ALL POINTS CITED AS CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO THE 
VALIDITY OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE AGREEMENT 
HAVE BEEN FACTUALLY CONTROVERTED AND THERE ARE 
QUESTIONS OF FACT ON EACH OF THOSE CITED POINTS 
There is a question of fact and law about whether the 
Defendant by his acts is estopped from alleging that Plaintiff 
did not perform engineering studies or that Plaintiff did not 
provide a trust for membership dues. In the alternative, the 
Defendant waived the engineering requests as well as those of the 
trust. In addition, these as well as all other facts were 
controverted and a question of fact exists. 
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is estopped from 
alleging that "Defendant has not approved financing." Where, 
pursuant to the affidavits submitted it would appear that the 
Defendant unreasonably refused to cooperate in obtaining 
financing and indeed took steps to impede such financing. 
POINT III 
ALL POINTS CITED TO SHOW THAT THE PURPORTED ORAL 
LEASE IS NOT VALID HAVE BEEN CONTROVERTED IN THE RECORD 
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The affidavits and depositions cited have controverted the 
facts alleged by Defendant and raise reasonable issues of fact. 
POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MAY ONLY BE GRANTED WHERE 
THERE IS NO ISSUE OF FACT: 
With respect to Points II and III, the Court is not called 
upon to weigh evidence or make findings of fact, Burningham v. 
Ott 525 P.2d 620 (Utah, 1974). The Court is not permitted to nor 
required to make findings of fact but can only find that there 
are no issues of fact. Carr v Bradshaw Chevrolet Co. 464 P.2d 
580 23 Ut. 2d 415 (Utah 1970) and the Court cannot consider 
weight or credibility of witnesses Singleton v. Alexander 431 
P.2d 126, 19 Ut. 2d 292. 
Further, to sustain a motion for summary judgment, the 
pleadings, evidence, admissions and inferences should be most 
favorably reviewed from point of view of the party opposing 
summary judgment must show that there is no issue of material 
fact Frederick May £ Co^ v Dunn 368 P. 2d 266, 13 Ut. 2d 40 (Utah, 
1962) See also Bowen v. Riverton City 656 P.2d 434. 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Plaintiff was not given an opportunity to conduct 
discovery necessary to properly place all facts before the court. 
2. The facts upon which Defendant relies have been 
controverted. 
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3. The Court is required to determine only that there are 
no issues of fact. This is clearly not the case. 
4.- Review of materials submitted in affidavits and 
depositions must be interpreted in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. 
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment should be reversed 
and the case remanded for further discovery and trial. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1985. 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
Lorin N. Pace 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true, correct, and 
complete copy of the document to which this certificate is 
appended or included was mailed via first class mail with postage 
prepaid to the hereinafter designated addressee(s) on the 
day of June, 1985: 
ADDRESSEE(S): 
L. R. Gardiner, jr. 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
American Plaza II - Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
P.O. Box 3450 
S a l t Lake C i ty , Utah 84110-3450 
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CONSTRUCTION AND LEASE AGREEMENT FOR THE DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB 
This Agreement executed by and between S. M. HORMAN AND 
SONS, a partnership, hereinafter referred to as "Lessor," and 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, INC*, a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Lessee." 
In consideration of the covenants, representations and 
promises herein reserved and contained on the part of Lessee to 
be paid, performed and observed, the Lessor does hereby agree to 
lease, perform construction work on, demise and let unto Lessee 
the premises hereinafter described, and the Lessee does hereby 
hire and take from the Lessor the said premises, upon the follow-
ing terms and conditions: 
I Premises. The premises included in this Agreement are 
part of the Harver Warehouse Building and/or part of the Kress 
Building ^nd/or part of the Grant Building, located in downtown 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as more particularly described and shown on 
Exhibit A, which is a property description of the building(s) to 
be used. In the event that any or all of said buildings 3re 
demolished, the premises shall be located in the new buildings 
built upon the same locations where the referenced buildings are 
presently located. 
II Occupancy. It is the intent of the partie's to this 
Agreement that Lessee shall have occupancy of the portions of the 
"premises" as more particularly described as follows: 
III 
expense 
premises 
A. Harver Warehouse Building—Lessor shall install 
all permanent improvements for the basement level, 
ground level, second floor, new third floor, and 
new roof level of the Harver Warehouse Building 
location including heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, electrical systems, plumbing, 
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and 
24 
A 
B. 
C 
Harver Warehouse Building—The basement location, 
ground level, second floor and roof level of the 
Harver Warehouse Building location, as more par-
ticularly described and shown on the floor plans *^ 
attached hereto as Exhibits A(1) through k(5)
 f^k/^ 
, as 
the 
more 
floor 
Grant Building—The portion of the Grant Building 
referred to generally as the southeast corner of 
the main level of the Grant Building 
particularly described and shown on 
plans attached pereto as Exhibit B 
Construction 
to make the 
as follows: 
Lessor 
following 
agrees^ xat its 
improvements to 
sole 
the 
cost and 
described 
walkways, lighting, interior and party walls, 
decking, and all engineering, architectural and 
structural work related thereto sufficiently to 
cause the premises to house the facilities shown 
in the floor plan as more particularly described 
and shown as floor plans on Exhibits A(1) through 
(4), provided that the Harver Building can be 
reinforced at a price that is acceptable to Lessor 
and Lessee, and in a manner which will satisfy the 
requirements of the Salt Lake City Building De-
partment, All costs of remodeling and construc-
tion shall be borne by Lessor provided, however, 
that Lessee shall provide its own leasehold im-
provements and furnishings on said premises. 
Lessor and Lessee agree and Lessor understands 
that Lessee's leasehold improvements shall be 
considered by the Lessor and Lessee to specific-
ally include, be defined and shall further be 
considered as the Lessee's personal property, all 
furnishings, removable fixtures, appliances, 
removable equipment and machinery as more par-
ticularly described and shown on Exhibit C. 
B. Grant Building—Lessor shall install ail permanent 
improvements for the main level of the Grant 
Building including heating, ventilation, air 
conditioning, electrical systems, plumbing, 
sprinkling systems, fire systems, stairways and 
walkways, lighting, interior and party walls, 
decking, and all engineering, architectural and 
structural work related thereto sufficiently to 
cause the premises to house the facilities shown 
in the floor plan as more particularly described 
and shown on Exhibits 8(1) and (2), provided that 
the Grant Building can be remodeled at a price 
that is acceptable to both Lessor and Lessee, and 
in a manner which will satisfy the requirements of 
the Salt Lake City Building Department. All costs 
of remodeling and construction shall be borne by 
Lessor provided, however, that Lessee shall pro-
vide its own leasehold improvements and furnish-
ings on said premises. Lessor and Lessee agree 
and Lessor understands that Lessee's leasehold 
impr-ovements shall be considered by the Lessor and 
Lessee to specifically include, be defined and 
shall further be considered as the Lessee's per-
sonal property, furnishings, removable fixtures, 
appliances, removable equipment and machinery as 
more particularly described and shown on Exhibit 
D. 
In addition, the Lessor and Lessee understand and agree that the 
Lessor may modify, change or alter the design specifications 
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contained in the floor plans as more particularly described and 
shown on Exhibits A(1) and (2), B(1) and (2), C and D as required 
by applicable governmental and regulatory agencies sufficient to 
obtain building permits and the final certificate of completion 
for the project. 
IV Performance, Lessor agrees that the construction of 
the improvements described above and as more particularly de-
scribed and shown on Exhibits A and B shall be commenced not 
later than seven days following confirmed receipt and acceptance 
by Lessor of construction financing acceptable to Lessor at the 
offices of the lender of Lessor's choice, and shall be completed 
within 12 months thereafter* If there shall be a delay in the 
construction or repair of any improvements caused by strikes, 
riots, acts of God, shortages of labor or materials, national 
emergency, governmental restrictions, laws or regulations or any 
other cause or causes beyond either partyfs control, such delay 
shall not be a violation of this Lease and the time periods set 
forth in this Lease 'for any such work shall at such party's 
option be extended for a period of time equal to the period of 
delay. Anything to the contrary herein contained notwithstand-
ing, the design and construction of the store front for the 
Premises shall be at Lessor's sole cost and expense. In addi-
tion, it is agreed and understood that Lessor shall construct the 
improvements called for in this Lease with the understanding that 
Lessee shall sell a sufficient number of memberships prior to 
completion of the Athletic Club to guarantee that the payments 
required by this contract will be paid; Lessee agrees to assign 
dues income in a sufficient amount to guarantee said payments 
according to individual membership contracts by contract number 
to a special account designated solely for the payment of monthly 
lease payments due and payable under the terms of this Lease. 
These contracts must be acceptable to Lessor and the mortgage 
loan company. 
V Lease Term. The term of the Lease shall be as follows: 
A, Original Term--The parties hereby agree that 
effective with the date of execution of this 
Agreement that the Lessee shall have the use of 
the Premises for the sum of ONE DOLLAR AND MO/100 
($1.00) per month with the additional understand-
ing that Lessee agrees to pay for his own utili-
ties. At such time as the improvements described 
in paragraph two are substantially completed, the 
permanent term of this Lease shall commence. The 
permanent term shall be for a period of 15 years 
commencing after Lessor and Lessee agree improve-
ments to the building are substantially complete, 
and the premises can be occupied by Lessor and 
open to the public for business. The Lease shall 
end on the last day of the 15th year. The $1.00 
per month herein refers to the office space in the 
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Kress Building. If Lessor leases this building, 
Lessee will be required to relocate. 
B. Option to Renew—If the Lessee desires to continue 
to occupy the premises for an additional period, 
the Lessee shall have successive one year renewal 
terms after giving notice to the Lessor, prior to 
the expiration of the original term of each prior 
renewal period. Upon such action, the Lessee 
shall have a renewal of said Lease for an addi-
tional one year period at a rate acceptable to 
Lessor. 
VI Lease Payments. Lease payments for the premises and 
improvements described in this Agreement shall be equivalent to 
the sum of the following three elements computed and payable on a 
monthly basis: 
A. The portion of the monthly amortization of the 
permanent financing attributed to interest over 
the initial 15 year lease period referred to 
herein; plus 
The portion of the monthly amortization of the 
permanent financing attributed to the principal 
sum required in construction of this job, includ-
ing the prorated amount of land cost, computed as 
the declining balance over the initial 15 year 
lease period; plus 
The monthly charge of $0,085 ($1.00 per year) per 
premises based 
approx imately 
to the above 
to the Lessor 
upon a 
64 ,6^0 
monthly 
a total 
square foot of the leased 
total square footage of 
square feet. In addition 
payments, Lessee shall pay 
of $64,000.00 per year 
$5»333.33 to represent the 
is required to pay to the 
Warehouse Building. In addition to this 
$64,000.00, the Lessee will be required to pay an 
increase added to this sum of $9t000.00 per year 
making a total of $73,000.00 each year during the 
second five-year period of this lease, payable 
monthly, and during the third five-year period of 
this Lease, this amount will increase to 
$82,000.00 per year, payable in equal monthly 
payments. It is further agreed that the minimum 
rent will be no less than $36,000.00 per month 
during the first year and this amount will in-
crease thereafter as herein described. 
payable monthly at 
amount of rent Lessor 
owner of the Harver 
Cost of Living Index Annual Computation—In addi-
tion to the above rent described in Items A and B 
herein, Lessee will be required to increase the 
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rent described in this Lease equal to any increase 
in the cost of living index. However, this in-
crease will not exceed the sum of eight percent 
(85) per year even though the increase in the cost 
of living index may exceed that amount. 
E. Security Deposit—The Lessee shall remit to Lessor 
the sum of $20,000 within 10 days after commence-
ment of construction; the sum of $20,000 within 2 
days after construction is certified to be 50? 
complete, and the sum of $30,000 on or before 
Lessee shall occupy the improved space as speci-
fied above. 
F. Acquisition of Sufficient Financing—This Lease is 
subject to Lessor being able to secure sufficient 
financing to rebuild or remodel as the case may be 
the premises to be occupied under the terms of 
this Lease at a rate not to exceed 125 (12 per-
cent) per annum, and that Lessee shall pay all 
annual interest charges in excess of 125 (12 
percent) per annum, provided that if the Lessor 
does decide to pay a higher interest rate than 
twelve percent (125), the annual interest rate is 
acceptable to the Lessee. 
VII Use of Premises. The premises shall be used and occu-
pied by the Lessee for the purpose of operating an athletic club, 
including all uses associated therewith, i-svcluding but not limi-
ted to physical exercise, training and conditioning facilities, 
restaurants, snack bars, club facilities, and such other uses as 
may be reasonably associated therewith. Lessee shall occupy and 
use the premises for this purpose only and no other. Lessee 
shall not make or permit any use of the premises which shall 
constitute a nuisance or which shall cause offensive odors, 
sounds or appearances or which, directly or indirectly, is for-
bidden by public law, ordinance or governmental or municipal 
regulation or order. Lessee shall at its expense be entitled to 
place decorations or other improvements inside the premises and 
shall furnish and maintain the same in a good and attractive 
condition, at Lessee's expense and risk. It is understood and 
agreed that this is a "triple net" Lease in which zhe Lessee 
agrees to assume full responsibility for the payment of ail taxes 
(particularly including but not limited to property taxes), 
insurance and maintenance of the Harver Building, or for any 
other improvements located in any other building occupied by 
Lessee. Lessee shall occupy and use the premises in a lawful 
manner complying with all laws and ordinances of the State of 
Utah, the City of Salt Lake, the county of Salt Lake, and all 
rules and regulations of the Board of Fire Underwriters for Salt 
Lake City, State of Utah. 
VIII Parking. The Lessor shall provide parking on a first-
come, first served basis to accommodate the customers of the 
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Lessee with respect to the premises described in this Agreement. 
Lessor agrees to provide access to the Harver Parking Terrace for 
the members, customers and guests of the Downtown Athletic Club 
on the same basis as other tenants of the Kress Building, Grant 
Building, and other adjoining buildings to the premises described 
in this Agreement. 
IX Utilities. The Lessor shall until substantial com-
pletion of construction and remodeling of the premises pay all 
utilities within and upon the premises and thereafter Lessee 
shall be responsible for and shall promptly pay all charges for 
use or consumption of separately metered heat, sewer, water, gas, 
electricity or any other utility services from the date of com-
mencement of the lease term, with the understanding that Lessor 
shall make provisions to separately meter water, gas, electricity 
and other utility services consumed by Lessee. 
X Indemnification. The Lessee shall indemnify Lessor and 
save it harmless from suits, actions, damages, liability and 
expense in connection with loss of life, bodily or personal 
injury or property damage arising from or out of the use or 
occupancy of the premises or any part thereof, or occasioned 
wholly or in part by any act or omission of Lessee, its agents, 
contractors, employees, servants, invitees, licensees or con-
cessionaires, whether occurring in or about the leased premises 
but excluding the-common areas and facilities or elsewhere within 
the premises. Lessee shall not be liable for damage or injury 
proximately caused by the negligence of Lessor , or its agents, 
servants or employees. This obligation to indemnify shall in-
clude reasonable attorneys fees and investigation costs and all 
other reasonable costs, expenses and liabilities from the first 
notice that any claim or demand is to be made or may be made. 
Lessor shall not be responsible or liable to Lessee or to those 
claiming by, through or under Lessee, except in the event of 
negligence for any loss or damage to either the persons or prop-
erty of Lessee that may be occasioned by or through the acts or 
occupying adjacent, connecting or otherwise 
Lessee shall be responsible for any defect, 
in any of the equipment, machinery, utili-
apparatus in the building and shall be re-
sponsible and liable for any injury, loss or damage to any person 
or to any property of Lessee or other person caused by or result-
ing from bursting, breakage, or by or from leakage, or failure of 
fire sprinklers. Lessor shall not be responsible or liable for 
any loss or damage to either the persons or property of Lessee 
leakage of steam or snow or ice, running, 
the overflow of water or sewerage in any 
or for any injury or damage caused by or 
God or the elements, or for any injury or 
damage caused by or resulting from any of said premises, the 
building, machinery, apparatus or equipment by any person or by 
or from the acts or negligence of any other occupant of the 
premises. Lessee shall give prompt notice to the Lessor in case 
omissions of persons 
adjoining premises, 
latent or otherwise, 
ties, appliances or 
which may be caused by 
backing up, seepage or 
part of said premises, 
resulting from acts of 
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of fire or accidents in the premises or in the building or of 
defects therein or in any fixtures or equipment. 
X I
 Waiver of Subrogation, The Lessor and the Lessee 
hereby waive any rights each may have against the other on ac-
count of any loss or damage occasioned to the Lessor or the 
Lessee, as the case may be, their respective property, the prem-
ises, or its contents, or to other portions of the premises, 
arising from any risk generally covered by fire and extended 
coverage insurance; and the parties, each on behalf of their 
respective" insurance companies, insuring the property of either 
the Lessor or the Lessee, against any such loss, waive any right 
of subrogation that it may have against the Lessor or the Lessee, 
as the case may be. 
XII Lessee's Insurance. The Lessee further covenants and 
agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement date 
of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by the 
Lessee in the premises, it will carry and maintain, at its sole 
cost and expense, the following types of insurance in the amounts 
specified and in the form hereinafter provided for: Bodily 
injury liability insurance with limits of not less than ONE 
MILLION DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($1,000,000.00) per person and TWO 
MILLION DOLLARS AND N0/100 ($2,000,000.00) ?er occurrence insur-
ing against any and all liability of the insured with respect to 
said premises or arising out of the maintenance, use of occupancy 
thereof, and property damage liability insurance with a limit of 
not less than TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS AND NO/100 
($200,000.00) per accident or occurrence. All such bodily injury 
liability insurance and property damage liability insurance shall 
specifically insure the performance by Lessee of the indemnity 
agreement as to liability for injury to or death of persons and 
injury or damage to property described herein. 
XIII Lessee's Improvements, The Lessee further covenants 
and agrees that, from and after the earlier of the commencement 
date of the term hereof or the commencement of any business by 
the Lessee in the premises, it will carry and maintain insurance 
covering all of Lessee's leasehold improvements, alterations, 
additions or improvements, trade fixtures, merchandise and per-
sonal property from time to time in, on or upon the premises, in 
an amount not less than eighty percent (80%) of their full re-
placement costs from time to time during the term of this Agree-
ment, providing protection against any peril included.within the 
classification "Fire and Extended Coverage," together with insur-
ance against sprinkler damage, vandalism and malicious mischief. 
Any policy proceeds shall be used for the repair or replacement 
of the property damaged or destroyed unless this Agreement shall 
cease and terminate under the provisions described herein. 
XIV LessorT s Insurance. The Lessor shall at all times from 
and after the commencement date of the term hereof maintain in 
effect a policy or policies of insurance covering the building of 
which the premises are a part, in an amount not less than ninety 
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XV Increase in Insurance Premiums. Lessee agrees that it 
will not at any time during the term of this Agreement carry any 
stock or goods or do anything in or about the premises which will 
in any way tend to increase the insurance rates upon the building 
of which the premises are a part. The Lessor acknowledges and 
agrees that there will be restaurants on the premises and such 
use shall not be considered to be an increased insurance cost or 
cause of cancellation of Lessor's insurance. The Lessee agrees 
to pay to the Lessor forthwith upon demand the amount of any 
increase in premiums for insurance against loss by fire that may 
be charged during the term of this Agreement on the amount of 
insurance to be carried by Lessor on the building of which the 
premises are a part resulting from the foregoing or from Lessee 
doing any act in or about said premises which does so increase 
the insurance rates. If due to the occupancy, abandonment, or 
Lessee's failure to occupy the premises as herein provided, any 
insurance shall be cancelled by the insurance carrier or if the 
premiums for any such insurance shall be increased, then in any 
of such events the Lessee shall indemnify and hold Lessor harm-
less and shall pay on demand the increased cost of such insur-
ance . 
XVI Destruction of Leased Premises. If the premises are 
partially damaged by any casualty insurable under the Lessor's 
insurance policy, Lessor shall, upon receipt of the insurance 
proceeds, repair the same, and the applicable monthly lease 
payment of the premises shall be abated proportionately as to 
that portion of the premises rendered untenantable. If the 
premises by reason of such occurrence are rendered wholly unten-
antable, or should be damaged as a result of a risk which is not 
covered by the Lessor's insurance, or should be damaged in whole 
or in part during the last three (3) years of the term or any 
renewal term hereof, or the building (whether the premises are 
damaged or not) should be damaged to the extent of fifty percent 
(50$) or more of the then monetary value thereof, or damaged to 
such an extent that the premises cannot be operated as an integ-
ral commercial unit, then or in any of such events, Lessor may 
either elect to repair the damage or may cancel this Agreement by 
notice of cancellation within one hundred eight (180) days after 
such event and thereupon this Agreement shall expire, and Lessee 
shall vacate and surrender the leased premises to Lessor. Les-
see's liability for rent upon the termination of this Agreement 
shall cease as of the day following the event or damage. In the 
event Lessor elects to repair the damage insurable under Lessor's 
policies, any abatement or rent shall end five (5) days after 
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notice by Lessor to Lessee that the leased premises have been 
repaired. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to abate 
percentage lease payments, but the computation of such payments 
shall be based upon the revised minimum lease payments as the 
same may be abated. Unless this Agreement is terminated by 
Lessor, Lessee shall repair and refixture the interior of the 
premises in a manner and to at least a condition equal to that 
existing prior to its destruction or casualty and the proceeds of 
all insurance carried by Lessee on its property and improvements 
shall be held in trust by Lessee for the purpose of said repair 
or replacement. 
XVII Condemnation of Leased Premises. If the whole of the 
premises shall be acquired or taken by eminent domain for any 
public or quasi-public use or purpose, then this Agreement and 
the terms hereof shall cause and terminate in any such event. If 
any part of the premises shall be taken as aforesaid, and such 
partial taking shall render that portion not so taken unsuitable 
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement and the terms 
hereof shall cease and terminate as aforesaid. If such partial 
taking is not extensive enough to render the premises unsuitable 
for the business of Lessee then this Agreement shall continue in 
effect except that the minimum lease payment shall be reduced in 
the same proportion that the floor area of the premises (includ-
ing basement) taken bears to the original floor area demised and 
Lessor shall, upon receipt of the award in condemnation, make all 
necessary repairs or alterations to the building so as to recon-
stitute the portion of the building not taken as a complete 
architectural unit, but such work shall not exceed the scope of 
the work to be done by Lessor in originally constructing said 
building, nor shall Lessor in any event be required to spend for 
such work an amount in excess of the net amount received by 
Lessor as damaged for the part of the demised premises so taken. 
"Net amount received by Lessor" shall mean that part of the award 
in condemnation proceedings which is free and clear to Lessor of 
any collection by mortgagees for the value of the diminished fee. 
If more than twenty (20) percent of the floor area of the premi-
ses shall be taken as aforesaid, Lessor may, by written notice to 
Lessee, terminate this Agreement, such termination to be effec-
tive as aforesaid. If this Agreement is terminated as provided 
in this paragraph the lease payment shall be paid up to the day 
that possession is so taken by public authority and Lessor shall 
make an equitable refund of any lease payment paid by Lessee in 
advance. 
XVIII Award. The Lessee shall not be entitled to and ex-
pressly waives all claim to any condemnation award for any tak-
ing, whether whole or partial, and whether for diminution in 
value of the leasehold or of the fee, although Lessee shall have 
the right, to the extent that the same shall not reduce Lessor's 
award, to claim from the condemnor, but not from Lessor, such 
compensation as may be recoverable by Lessee in its own right for 
damage to Lessee's business and trade fixtures, if such claim can 
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be made separate and apart from any award to Lessor and without 
prejudice to Lessor's award. 
XIX Right to Re-Enter. If the Lessee shall default in 
payment of the lease payments reserved hereunder for a period of 
twenty (20) days after any of the same shall have become due and 
payable as aforesaid, or if Lessee shall abandon or appear to 
abandon the premises or fail to conduct business therein for a 
period of seven (7) consecutive business days, or if default 
shall be made by Lessee in any of the other covenants and agree-
ments herein contained to be kept and fulfilled on the part of 
the Lessee (except with respect to the defaults specified herein) 
for a period of twenty (20) days after written notice of such 
default is given by the Lessor to the Lessee without action by 
the Lessee to remedy such default and continuance of such action 
to remedy such default to conclusion with reasonable diligence or 
if the Lessee makes any transfer, assignment, conveyance, sale, 
pledge or disposition, of all or a substantial portion of its 
property or removes a substantial portion of its personal proper-
ty from the- premises other than by reason of an assignment or 
subletting of the premises permitted under this Agreement, or if 
the Lessee's interest herein shall be sold under execution then 
and forthwith thereafter the Lessor shall have the right:, at its 
option and without prejudice to its premises, or the Lessor, 
without such re-entry may recover possession of the premises, ana 
that after default be made in any of the covenants contained 
herein, the acceptance of lease payments or failure to re-enter 
by Lessor shall not be held to be a waiver of its right to termi-
nate this Agreement, and the Lessor may "re-enter and take posses-
sion thereof the same as if no rent had been accepted after such 
default. All of the remedies given to the Lessor in this para-
graph or elsewhere in this lease in the event of default by 
Lessee, are in addition to and not in derogation of all other 
rights or remedies to which Lessor may be entitled under the laws 
of the State of Utah, and all such remsdies shall not be deemed a 
waiver of any other or further rights or remedies. 
XX Maintenance. Lessee shall be responsible for mainte-
nance, repair and replacement of all heating, ventilating, air 
conditioning, plumbing and electrical systems on said premises 
and all interior maintenance of the building; in addition, Lessee 
shall be responsible for all plumbing, mechanical, electrical 3nd 
other maintenance related to swimming pools, and other special 
use equipment installed by Lessee. 
XXI Bankruptcy. To the full extent permissible under the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, specifically Section 365 thereof 
(11 U.S.C. 365) or any successor thereto, if Lessee shall file a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or take the benefit of any 
insolvency act or be dissolved or adjudicated a bankrupt, or if a 
receiver shall be appointed for its business or its assets and 
the appointment of such receiver is not vacated within sixty (60) 
days after such appointment, or if it shall make an assignment 
for the benefit of its creditors then and forthwith thereafter 
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the Lessor shall have all of the rights provided herein in the 
event of non-payment, 
XXII Quiet Enjoyment. Lessee, upon payment of the lease 
payments and performing all of the terms on its part to be per-
formed, shall peaceably and quietly enjoy the premises. 
XXIII Force Majeure. The parties shall be excused for the 
period of any delay in the performance of any obligations here-
under, when prevented from so doing by cause or causes beyond 
their control which shall include, without limitation, all labor 
disputes, civil commotion, war, war-like operations, invasions, 
rebellion, hostilities, military or usurped power, sabotage, 
governmental regulations or controls, fire or other casualty, 
inability to obtain any material or services or through acts of 
God. Nothing contained in this paragraph or elsewhere in this 
Agreement shall be deemed to excuse or permit any delay in the 
payment of any sums of money required hereunder, or any delay in 
the cure of any default which may be cured by the payment of 
money. Mo reliance by Lessee upon this paragraph shall limit or 
restrict in any way Lessor's right to self-help as provided in 
this Agreement. No party shall be entitled to rely upon this 
paragraph unless it shall advise the other party in writing of 
the existence of any force majeure preventing the performance of 
an obligation within fifteen (15) days after the commencement of 
the force majeure. 
XXIV Enforcement of Lease Expenses. If it becomes necessary 
for either party hereto to enforce the covenants of this Lease, 
the defaulting party will pay to the other party all costs and 
attorney's fees that shall arise from enforcing this Agreement. 
XXV Strict Performance. It is mutually agreed that the 
failure of the Lessor or the Lessee to insist upon strict per-
formance of any of the covenants, restrictions or conditions of 
this Agreement, or to exercise any option herein covered, in any 
one or more instances, shall not be construed as a waiver or 
relinquishment of any such covenants, agreements, conditions or 
options, but the same shall be and remain in full force and 
effect. 
XXVI Binding Effect. It is further mutually covenanted and 
agreed that all covenants, agreements, conditions, stipulations, 
recitals and options or elections herein contained to be kept and 
performed by or given to and to be exercised by either party 
shall bind and inure to the benefits of the legal representative, 
successors and assigns of such party and to grantees of the 
Lessor, excepting that no assignment by or through the Agreement 
in violation of the provisions of this Agreement shall vest any 
rights in the assignee. 
XXVII Notices. Notices and demands hereunder or pursuant to 
any statute or ordinance now or hereafter enforced shall be 
validly and sufficiently served, given or made if mailed in a 
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sealed envelope, postage prepaid, and if intended for the Lessee, 
addressed to the Lessee at 257 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, or if intended for the Lessor, addressed to the Lessor at 
1760 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, until either party 
shall designate by written notice a new address to which any such 
notice or demand shall thereafter be so addressed and mailed. 
XXVIII Remedies. All rights and remedies of the Lessor or 
Lessee herein enumerated shall be cumulative, and none shall 
exclude any other right or remedy allowed by law. 
XXIX General Provisions. No receipt of money by the Lessor 
from Lessee after the termination of this Agreement or after the 
service of any notice or after the commencement of 
after final judgment for possession of the premises 
reinstate, continue or extend the term of this 
affect any such notice, demand or suit. The words 
"Lessee" wherever used in this Agreement shall be 
mean Lessors or Lessees in all cases where there is 
Lessor or Lessee, and 
any suit, or 
shall renew, 
Agreement or 
"Lessor" and 
construed to 
more than one 
the necessary grammatical changes required 
to make the provisions hereof apply either to corporations, 
partnership or individuals, men or women and shall in all cases 
be assumed as though each case was fully expressed. Provisions 
inserted herein or affixed herto shall not be valid unless ap-
pearing in the duplicate original hereof held by Lessor. In 
event of variation or discrepancy, Lessor's duplicate original 
shall control. The captions here are inserted only as a matter 
of convenience or for reference. and in no way define, limit or 
describe the scope of this Agreement or the intent of any pro-
vision therein. 
XXX Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed, and 
the rights and obligations of the Lessor and Lessee shall be 
determined according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
XXXI Recordation, The parties to this Agreement agree that 
the Lessee shall not record this Lease. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set 
their hands and seals on this the $"** day of NN^ WX , 
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Lorin V. Pace # 2498 
G. Randall Klimt # 1839 
William B. Parsons # 2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterplaintiff 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB 
University Club Building, Suite 1200 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
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S. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a 
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN & 
SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S . M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
-v-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
c o r p o r a t i o n , and DAVID G. YURTH, 
and i n d i v i d u a l , 
Counterdefendants . 
STATE OF UTAH | 
I :SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE | 
Comes now the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn under oa 
hereby deposes and says as follows: 
1 
C i v i l No. C83-6545 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
DAVID YURTH 
1. My name is David Yurth. I am a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
currently residing at 9642 Kelly Brook Drive. I am the President and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Downtown Athletic Club, Inc., which is a Utah 
Corporation. 
2. In the summer of 1980 I approached Mr. Horman to determine whether 
space in the Harver Warehouse Building could be made available for the purpose 
of constructing and operating an athletic club. After some negotiations, I 
entered into a verbal agreement with Mr. Horman under which I would be allowed 
to occupy the Main Street portion of the Kress Building at 257 South Main 
Street to begin the sales of memberships in the facility which Mr. Horman and 
I agreed was to be built in the basement, third, fourth and fifth floors of 
the Harver Warehouse. 
3. Prior to the sale of memberships, Mr. Horman and I agreed that on 
condition that sufficient memberships could be sold to guarantee the success 
of the venture; that a co-maker of acceptable financial strength could be 
persuaded to guarantee payment of the lease for an athletic club; that permits 
could be obtained for the construction of such a facility; that mutually 
agreeable financing could be obtained to pay for the costs of improvements; 
that I would assign in trust monthly dues revenue from the membership sales to 
guarantee payment of the lease; and that I obtain an operating line of credit 
of at least $20,000 to insure that the start-up costs could be borne by 
Downtown Athletic Club, that Mr. Horman would build the improvements we had 
agreed to; that Downtown Athletic Club would be allowed to occupy the Main 
Street Level of the Kress Building until the project was substantially 
completed; and that Downtown Athletic Club would obtain a written contract 
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which reflected the terms of our verbal agreement upon my having verified to 
him that I had satisfied the conditions of our verbal agreement. 
4. After having sold nearly 1,000 memberships by January of 1981; 
obtaining a suitable guarantor for the lease; having obtained the operating 
credit line which was agreed to; occupying the Main Street level of the Kress 
Building at no cost to me since August 1980; and having arrived at a firm 
agreement on the improvements to be constructed in the warehouse, Mr. Horman 
and his agents applied to the Salt Lake City Department of Building and 
Housing for a permit to build the International Marketplace Specialty Mall, 
which was to have included the athletic club improvements. Mr. Horman placed 
ads in nationally circulated shopping center trade publications advertising 
the International Marketplace which listed the Athletic Club as the prime 
tenant. 
5. After inspecting the subject property, including the Harver 
Warehouse, WT Grant, American Theater and Kress Buildings, the application 
for a building permit for the specialty mall was denied on the grounds that 
Mr. Horman and his construction crews had performed substantial demolition 
work which had structurally damaged the buildings, which were conducted 
without proper building permits, which were in violation of the uniform 
building code, and for which no engineering records had been kept. Mr. Horman 
and I attended meetings held by the Hearing and Appeals Board of the 
Department of Building and Housing in the City Council Chamber of the City and 
County Building in the early spring of 1981. After reviewing Mr. Horman1s 
appeal for waiver, the appeal was denied. Mr. Roger Evans, City Building 
Inspector was instructed by the Board to issue a permit for construction only 
on condition that Mr. Horman conduct engineering studies to determine the 
structural and seismic integrity of the subject property. 
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6. By May of 1981, Mr. Horman was satisfied that Downtown Athletic Club 
had sold sufficient memberships to guarantee the success of the venture 
without requiring that the lease be guaranteed by a co-maker. A trust 
agreement to govern the assignment of monthly memberhsip dues had been 
drafted, reviewed by the loan officer at my bank, and submitted to Mr. Horman 
for review and execution on May 8, 1981. Mr. Horman and I executed a 
construction and lease agreement for the purpose of building the athletic club 
in Harver Warehouse. The only conditions which had not been completed at the 
time of the execution of the agreement were the assessment of the structural 
and siesmic integrity of the building by a licensed engineer and the 
acquisition of a construction loan. The executed agreement reflected every 
material term and condition to which we had agreed orally in August 1980. 
7. I understood and the agreement states that Mr. Horman was to be 
responsible for retaining and paying the engineers who were to conduct the 
requisite studies. I understood and the agreement states that Mr. Horman was 
to provide the construction funds, and that if the funds were to be borrowed, 
and if Mr. Horman was to be the borrower, that he would pay the annual 
interest charges up to 12% per annum, and that Downtown Athletic Club would 
pay any interest charges in excess of that. 
8. Mr. Horman did not retain a licensed engineer to conduct structural 
and siesmic studies. He engaged an employee, Mr. William Smith, who is not a 
licensed or qualified engineer and who was an employee of Mr. Horman, to 
prepare an estimate for the City Building Department. After conferring with 
Mr. Roger Evans, I was told that the results of any report prepared by Mr. 
Smith would not be acceptable for the purposes of obtaining a building permit. 
I told Mr. Horman as much, and when he refused to hire a licensed engineer, I 
4 
hired one myself. Our construction and lease agreement required Mr. Horman to 
retain a licensed engineer and pay for the engineering studies. I desribed to 
Mr. Grant Talbot, the retained engineer employed by Bonneville Engineering the 
extent of the studies to be performed and instructed him to invoice Mr. Horman 
for the costs incurred. I informed Mr. Horman that I had done so and he 
agreed that Bonneville Engineering was acceptable as a contractor to provide 
that service. 
9. Mid-way thru the studies I had occasion to consult with Mr. Talbot 
regarding his progress. I was appalled to discover that his study results 
were based on the data supplied to him by Mr. Horman1s employee, Mr. William 
Smith. I confirmed this observation in personal conversations with both Mr. 
Horman and Mr. Smith, and subsequently notified Mr. Talbot to terminate his 
work. Mr. Horman refused to pay for the engineering services rendered by 
Bonneville Engineering, and after receiving several billing notices from Mr. 
Talbot I instructed Corporate Counsel V. Dabney to send him a letter. 
10. Mr. Horman did not execute the trust agreement provided for the 
assignment of monthly dues revenue. Nor did he ever suggest any changes or 
modifications to the agreement. I personally delivered the document to him 
and was unable to execute the trust document because it required his written 
approval. The approval was never given, nor did I ever obtain a satisfactory 
reaction from him of any kind relative to the document. 
11. During this period, from May 81 to September 81, I attempted on 
several occasions to bring to Mr. Horman1s attention potential joint 
venturers, equity partners and construction lenders in an on-going effort to 
provide a satisfactory source of construction funds. Mr. Horman never at any 
time to ray knowledge made a legitimate attempt to obtain a construction loan 
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for the project, even though he agreed and the construction and lease 
agreement states that he was responsible to do so. No loan commitment of any 
kind was ever obtained through his offices for the athletic club project, even 
though I had repeatedly demonstrated performance on all the conditions of the 
construction and lease agreement. 
12. Within a week to ten days after the execution of the construction 
and lease agreement I delivered, personally, to Mr. Horman1s office an 
envelope containing $100 in cash and a receipt which I had prepared to meet 
the terms of our agreement for payment of $100.00 per month for rental of the 
space. Mr. Horman explained that the $100 per month charge was included in 
the agreement to satisfy the requirements of the company providing fire and 
casualty insurance on the building. Within a day or two thereafter I returned 
to Mr. Horman1s office and was given a signed copy of the receipt. I 
categorically deny that I or anyone of my staff forged, traced, or in any way 
attempted to affix a fabricated signature to that receipt for payment. Until 
demand was made, August 5, 1983 for Downtown Athletic Club to vacate the 
property, Mr. Horman never mentioned the matter of payment again. 
13. In September, 1981, I held meetings with Mr. Horman in his office in 
which we discused his willingness to build the athletic club as he had agreed. 
Downtown Athletic Club's legal counsel sent letters to him, which were never 
acknowledged, affirming our demonstrated performance under the lease and 
demanding that Mr. Horman proceed with construction as agreed. When Mr. 
Horman told me that he would not build the athletic club, I convened a meeting 
in his office which was attended by a number of contractors and officers for 
the Downtown Athletic Club. The purpose of the meeting ws to validate Downtown 
Athletic Club's performance under the construction and lease agreement, and to 
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come to an agreement with Mr. Horman that would result in the completion of 
the project and avoid my having to file a law suit to enforce the contract. 
14. After reviewing the status of the project, Mr. Horman and I agreed 
that if I was able to solve the engineering questions and obtain construction 
financing through my own resources that he would assign his master lease in 
the Harver Warehouse in its entirety to Downtown Athletic Club, Inc. It was 
agreed that Downtown Athletic Club would be allowed to continue to occupy the 
Kress Building without further payment until the project was either completed 
or abandoned. It was agreed that Downtown Athletic Club was free to engage 
its own architect, general contractor, engineers, lenders and agents or 
subcontractors of whatever variety was necessary to effect completion of the 
project. Mr. Horman required and I agreed, as did my Board of Directors, and 
subsequently both of Downtown Athletic Club's lenders, to hold Mr. Horman 
harmless and indemnify him against any recourse whatsoever by any creditor of 
Downtown Athletic Club for any defaults in the payment or performance of the 
terms of the master lease. It was agreed that the assignment would be 
executed prior to the closing of any construction loan. The terms of payment 
were agreed to and Mr. Horman wrote them in pencil on the top of the first 
page of a copy of the master lease agreement. He handed the document to me 
with a statement to the effect that he hoped I could make it work so he could 
stop making payments on a building that he had no use for. 
15. Mr. Horman indicated on a number of occasions that he would have 
preferred to assign the master lease with a release of his lessee obligations 
from the property owners, but also repeatedly told anecdotes to illustrate 
that the Carlson family was altogether unwilling to do that, under any 
circumstances. He agreed to consider a variety of other alternatives, and 
subsequent to the oral agreement we had to assign the lease did agree to sign 
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an assignment of the lease to Downtown Athletic Club which did not require 
that he be released from the master lease by the property owners. Having the 
Carlson's release him from the master lease was never a condition precedent to 
his assigning it to Downtown Athletic Club. 
16. In October of 1981 I engaged the firm of Cornwall, Evans and Fife to 
provide architectural and design services for Downtown Athletic Club, and 
asked them to contract with a structural engineer to develop the engineering 
analysis required by the City Building Department,, They engaged Mr. Ronald 
Webber, Structural Engineer, and he conducted, completed, and submitted the 
completed engineering analysis to them in November,, In December, Mr. Shirl 
Cornwall, Mr. Ronald Webber, and Mr. Scott Evans met in the offices of Mr. 
Roger Evans, Chief Building Inspector for Salt Lake City. The results and 
recommendations of the study were discussed, and Mr. Evans is reported by the 
architects to have approved the recommendation for structural reinforcement, 
estimated to cost approximately $100,000 (rather than $150,000 per floor as 
suggested by Mr. Grant Talbot of Bonneville Engineering). I conveyed this 
information personally to Mr. Horman and indicated that I was going to proceed 
with all possible speed to obtain a construction loan. 
17. Within 30 days after completion of the engineering studies, the 
prime interest rate had reached 21%. I knew, and Mr. Horman agreed, that it 
would be some time before the rate would drop to affordable levels. We 
therefore agreed that I could proceed to build a temporary athletic club 
facility in the basement and ground floor of the Kress Building, under the 
terms of the construction and lease agreement. That facility opened in March, 
1982 and operated until June of 1983. Never, at any time during the operation 
of that interim facility, did Mr. Horman, his agents or his legal counsel 
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-'nstruct me to remove it from the premises, notify me of any default or defect 
in my performance of the lease terms, or notify me verbally or in writing that 
the lease was terminated. In all respects and at all times Mr. Horman 
conducted his business affairs with me as if the lease were in full force and 
effect, and in accordance with that agreement, Downtown Athletic Club 
maintained his properties, paid for repairs to the heating & plumbing systmes, 
replaced glass broken from the doors by vandals, repaired the elevators and 
sprinkling system which froze in the winter, paid for the heating and lighting 
of properties, and continually policed the area to prevent and deal with 
vandalism and illegal trespass. Downtown Athletic Club provided these 
services because I had agreed with Mr. Horman to do so* 
18. In May, 1983, Champion Mortgage Company of San Diego, California, 
after a thorough review of all pertinent documents and an on-site inspection, 
provided Downtown Athletic Club with a contract guaranteeing to pay $5,000,000 
to the construction lender after 24 months from the issue date of a 
construction loan. Inasmuch as Downtown Athletic Club was to be the borrower, 
I notified Mr. Horman that the take-out commitment had been obtained, 
personally delivered a copy of the contract to his office, and instructed Mr. 
Dabney, Downtown Athletic Club's corporate counsel, to inform Mr. Horman that 
it was my intent to complete the project. He requested an assignment of the 
master lease as Mr. Horman had agreed. Mr. Horman did not execute an 
assignment nor did he respond to Mr. Dabneyfs notice verbally or in writing. 
19, In June of 1983, after receiving notice of Downtown Athletic Club's 
take-out commitments, etc., Mr. Horman executed a contract for the sale and 
purchase of the subject properties, along with an assignment of the master 
lease to the Harver Warehouse and Parking Garage with Mr. William Selvage. 
Paragraph l^ of that agreement is an acknowledgment by both parties that a 
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current, valid and enforceable lease contract and oral agreement to assign the 
master lease to Downtown Athletic Club was in existence at the time that 
contract was executed. A copy of that agreement was not provided to Downtown 
Athletic Club or my legal counsel by L. Ray Gardiner, Jr., counsel for the 
defendant, even though he repeatedly agreed to do so. I did not discover the 
existence of this contract until November, 1983. At that time Mr. Selvage 
filed a notice of contract against title to the property to prevent Downtown 
Athletic Club's loan from closing. 
20. In August, 1983, counsel for the Defendant sent to my attorney a 
letter denying that an agreement to assign the master lease had been entered 
into by the Defendant, alleging that Downtown Athletic Club had not performed 
any of its obligations under the construction and least agreement, and 
notifying us that Downtown Athletic Club was to vacate the premises by 
September 1, 1983. The letter also set forth the conditions which Mr. Horman 
and I had agreed to for an assignment of the master lease, and Mr. Gardiner 
confirmed to my legal counsel that if Downtown Athletic Club could demonstrate 
that those conditions had been met, an assignment of the master lease could be 
obtained. 
21. On August 30, 1983, I received a letter of commitement for a 
construction loan in the amount of $5,000,000. The letter was issued by 
Maurice Green of Transamerica Mortgage Company. It stated the terms and 
conditions under which the loan would be funded, and identified the time frame 
within which the closing would occur. I notified Mr. Dabney that the 
commitment had been obtained, supplied him with appropriate copies, and he 
conveyed notice of the receipt of the commitment, confirmation of Downtown 
Athletic Club's performance of the terms stipulated in Mr Gardiner's letter of 
10 
August 5 (and pursuant to Mr. Gardiner's verbal confirmation of the letterfs 
terms on September 2, 1983 to Mr. Dabney), and a draft assignment agreement to 
Mr. Gardiner. 
22. One day later, Mr. Gardiner responded in writing that he did not 
understand why I had sent the data to him, denying that he had agreed to 
proceed with execution of the lease assignment, and demanding that I vacate 
the Kress Building. 
23. Mr. Dabney responded, in a letter which I believe was hand-delivered 
to Mr. Gardiner, that there had indeed been a clear commitment to proceed with 
the assignment as agreed. Mr. Dabney also stated that he was recommending 
that I retain co-counsel since it was obvious that Mr. Dabney would be called 
upon to testify if litigation were to ensue; he also advised Mr. Gardiner to 
do the same. 
24. When it became obvious that Mr. Horman was totally unwilling, for 
reasons which were still very unclear at the time, to assign the lease to me 
and Downtown Athletic Club, after I had verified my performance of the terms 
and conditions of construction and lease agreement, and had acquired 
commitments to fund the construction of the scheduled improvements. I 
contacted B. Ray Zoll, attorney at law, and asked him to act as co-counsel 
with Mr. Dabney. After talking with Mr. Gardiner and corresponding with him, 
Mr."Zoll advised that we file a Lis Pendens against the property and prepare a 
verified complaint, which we did. 
25. Over the next 60 days, Mr. Zoll negotiated the terms of the lease 
assignment with Mr. Gardiner. Mr. Gardiner insisted that his office draft the 
document. As I recall the document was redrafted nearly 20 times, and I 
recall clearly that many if not all of the redrafts were the result of 
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arbitrary and completely inappropriate modifications to the oral agreement 
arrived at in the negotiation process. The drafting of that document was a 
most frustrating experience. I am convinced that Mr. Gardiner deliberately 
used the redrafts to provoke us to spend exhorbitant amounts of capital for 
the sole purpose of depleting my funds and causing me to withdraw from the 
case. 
26. When the agreement had finally been redrafted and modified to the 
point that both Mr. Horman and I had agreed to execute it, we agreed to meet 
on or about November 18 to sign the contract. On or about November 16 or 17, 
Mr. Gardiner called, and said he had discovered that a lien had been filed on 
the property by Mr. William Selvage, acting on behalf of Salt Lake Land 
Acquisition Group, and characterized the lien as a notice of contract. Mr. 
Gardiner denied any prior knowledge of an agreement to convey the property by 
Mr. Horman to Mr. Selvage, but repeatedly stated that any agreement between 
them had expired on its face, was null and void, and should not prevent us 
from executing our agreement of assignment. 
27. Mr. Zoll requested a copy of the agreement, and although Mr. 
Gardiner repeatedly confirmed his willingness to provide it, he never 
delivered the document. 
28. I personally met with Mr. Selvage to explore ways of mitigating the 
dilemma posed by his filing of the notice of contract. We negotiated an 
agreement in which Downtown Athletic Club would occupy the Harver Warehouse 
and later relocate its operations to suitable alternative facilities in 
SLLAG's block development plan in exchange for both groups removing their 
liens from the property. Mr. Zoll reviewed the terms of the greement with Mr. 
Sam Arthur, an attorney in Denver who represented SLLAG, and when it was 
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determined that the agreement was satisfactory in- principle, we drafted the 
complete set of documents reflecting the terms and conditions of that 
agreement. These documents were sent to Mr. Arthur and Mr. Selvage for 
review, modification and execution in late November. Neither of them 
responded to the submittal in writing, nor would either of them return or 
answer a phone call. The agreements were not executed, and the liens were 
left in place. 
29. Mr. Gardiner was requested by Mr. Zoll to assist me in having 
SLLAG1s lien removed so that we could proceed with the execution of our lease 
assignment. He flatly declined to do so. 
30. In December I notified both Champion Mortgage and Mr. Green at 
Transamerica that I had arrived at an impasse with Mr. Horman and Mr. Selvage. 
Mr. Green then sent me a letter which laid the blame for the failure of the 
loan to close squarely at Mr. Horman and Mr. Gardiner's feet, alleging that 
the agreement was drafted so unconscionably in favor of the Lessor as to make 
it wholly unacceptable to any lendor, notifying me that 30 days hence the 
commitment would irrevocably expire unless the impasse could somehow be 
resolved. 
31. Being left with absolutely no recourse, I instructed Mr. Zoll to 
serve process on Mr. Horman, which he did on the 90th day after the filing of 
the verified complaint. 
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Further the affiant saith not. 
-Ci DATED this (p " day of December, 1984. 
DAVID YURTH 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this \Q day of December, 1984 
My Commission Expires: LL*. 
Notary BgMic 
Residing At: S- L.C^jkf, LlM, V 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing 
Affidavit was hand delivered this day of December, 1984, to: 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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Lorin N. Pace # 2498 
G. Randall Klimt # 1839 
William B. Parsons # 2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterplaintiff 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB 
University Club Building, Suite 1200 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
S. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a 
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN & 
SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
-v-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH, 
and individual, 
Counterdefendants 
Civil No. C83-6545 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RUDY CURINGA 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
:SS 
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Comes now the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn under 
oath, and hereby deposes and says as follows: 
1. My name is Rudy Curinga. I am a resident of Salt Lake 
City, residing at 2960 East Willow Creek Drive, Sandy, Utah 84092 
engaged in the business of real estate development and real 
estate financing. I am self-employed and have operated my 
business under the license of R.R. Curinga & Associates, Inc. 
since March, 1984. Prior to incorporating, I operated as a d/b/a 
for 4 years in this capacity. 
2. In the late fall of 1982, I was referred to Mr. David 
Yurth, President of the Downtown Athletic Club by a realtor named 
Frank L. Bandt. I was requested to act on behalf of the Downtown 
Athletic Club to obtain construction and long term mortgage 
financing for the proposed athletic club project in the Harver 
Warehouse, located on Block 57 in Salt Lake City. 
3. I reviewed the development package and its descriptive 
documents, and during the winter and spring of 1983 negotiated 
with Champion Mortgage on Downtown Athletic Club's behalf to 
obtain a suitable stand-by take-out commitment for long term 
financing. In May of 1983 a stand by take-out commitment was 
issued to Downtown Athletic Club by Champion Mortgage after 
completion of their on-site inspection. 
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4. In August of 1983f Mr. Yurth and I negotiated with 
Maurice Green, a loan officer for Transamerica Occidental Life, 
and obtained a letter regarding a construction load request in 
the amount of $5,000,000. 
5. The letter indicated that the loan would actually be 
funded by a correspondent lender, and that the correspondent 
lender may require that an off-setting deposit, not hypothecated 
to the loan itself, but equal to the actual face amount of the 
construction loan, be deposited with the lending institution for 
the term of the loan in order for the interest rate to be 
established at a fixed rate. 
6. I agreed to make arrangements to place such off-setting 
deposits in the lending institution issuing the contruction loan, 
and confirmed to Mr. Martin Morrow, manager of the Beverly Hills 
Branch of Imperial Savings and Loan, in writing and over the 
telephone, that I would arrange such a deposit under terms and 
conditions to be negotiated prior to closing. 
7. With my experience in the real estate financing 
business, to the best of my knowledge the mechanics of 
compensating deposits was workable and practical and that the 
term and conditions and practices were consistent with the normal 
practices of lender in the marketplace, and that I could and 
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would have provided the off-setting deposit if it had been 
required. 
8. I am not now, nor have I ever been, an employee, 
officer or director of the Downtown Athletic Club. I have been 
engaged to act on their behalf as a contract agent, and have at 
all times acted independently in this matter. 
Further the affiant saith not. 
DATED this tp ^day of December, 1984. 
_..JNGA 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th 
1984 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Flblic 
6^l\-Z~] ResidingJAt: S.L C^iy
 f (iU 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above 
and foregoing Affidavit was hand delivered this day of 
December, 1984, to: 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
FOX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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August 30f 1983 
Mr. Frank Hargrove, Jr. 
Associated Legal Services 
Newport Irvine Center 
Newport Beach, California 92660 
Res Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Company 
Dear Mr. Hargrove, 
Mr. Green and I have been in quite close contact over 
the past two to three weeks regarding interim financing for 
a project to be built in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Mr. Green is in receipt of a loan package and loan 
request in the amount of $5,000,000.00 for a 2^-month term. 
Rate of interest and fees are to be negotiated. 
Pursuant to Mr. Greenfs request, this letter will confirm 
to you my offer and suggestion to Mr. Green to arrange for 
$5f000,000.00 to be deposited into an institution of your 
selection (F.D.I.C. or F.S.L.I.C. insured) and setting the 
interest rate for the construction loan on a "net spread" 
basis versus floating. A 24-month Certificate of Deposit 
would be taken back. 
I will be happy to discuss this with you at length. 
Best regards, 
Rudy R. Curinga 
RRCskf 
cci Mr. Dave Yurth 
f
S | # SENDER: Complete ttems 1.2.3. and 4. 
I Add your address in the "RETURN TO" space 
on reverse. 
(CONSULT POSTUASTER FOR FEES) 
1. The following service is requested (check one). 
Q Show to whom and date delivered ~~~. 
D Show to whom, date, and address of delivery.. 
I. a RESTRICTED DEUVERY 
{The restricted delivery fee k charged in addition to 
the return receipt fu.) 
TOTAL *_ 
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R.R. CURINGA AND ASSOCIATES 
September 20, 1983 
[v'.r. Martin Morrow 
Imoerial Thrift & Loan Association 
85~^ 9 Wilshire Blvd. 
Beverly Kills, California 9g 
Downtown Athletic Club, $aiu Lake City, Utah 
AND ^ "' 
Kr. Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Company 
AND 
Matching; Deposits 
Dear Mr. Morrow, 
This letter is being sent to you at the request of 
Mr. Green regarding the above referenced project which is 
to be built in the downtown business district, Salt Lake 
City. 
Mr. Green is the recipient of a loan package reflecting 
a construction loan request in the total amount of $5,000,000.00 
over a 2h month period. A Stand-3y/Take-Gut Commitment has 
been secured for a like amount. 
In an effort to fix the cost of money going in, this letter 
will confirm my offer to Mr. Green to arrange for $5#000,000.00 
to be deposited in your institution for a 2 year period at a 
fixed rate. 
It would be cur suggestion that the construction lean 
would be on a "net spread" basis versus a prime + ana floating. 
Please advise if I may be of further assistance to you. 
Best regards, 
Rudy R. Curinga 
RRCikf 
cc: Maurice Green, Transamerica Mortgage Comoany 
David Yurth, President, Downtown Athletic Club 
TELEPHONE (801) 942-2822 • 1528 E. WATERS LAME • SANDY, UTAH 84092 
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5288 Soutr-. 
Mr.rt.-;,Kio Bankers Since 189 
st S.m 
^ N 
:)8P0 Box 7727 
;RPCR« >N 
Mi:rrnv Ut.ih ^-l 10^ 
Phono 8 0 r . T ^ •: r 1 
\ 
'•^-sa** 
July 22, 1983 
Mr. Rudy Curinga 
1528 E. Water LN 
Sandy, UT 84092 
Re: Downtown Athletic Club; 
Champion Mortgage-Standby Commitment 
Dear Rudy, 
Please be advised that the undersigned is interested in pre-
senting the interim financing proposal on the Downtown Athletic 
Club to our loan committee, when we have the assurance to our 
satisfaction of the source of funds and the availabilitv of funds 
for the funding of the standby commitment. Also, we have not 
been presented with financial statements on the borrower, which 
must be in our file and approved by us before presentation to our 
loan committee. 
Thank you for given us the opportunity to review this proposal, 
and look forward to hearing from you further. 
Very truly yours, 
UTAH ffORTGAGE LOAN CORPORATION 
M. Vincent Jorgensen, 
Vice President 
Income Property Financing Division 
MVJ :erg 
LORIN N. PACE #2498 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
H. Di 
By 
DEC18J984 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
S.M. HORMAN, an individual, aka 
SID HORMAN, S.M. HORMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S.M. HORMAN 
& SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and Counterplaintiff, 
-vs-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUBf a Utah 
Corporationf and DAVID G. YUKIH, 
an individual, 
Defendants. 
EXTRAORDINARY REQUEST 
FOR REVIEW 
Civil No. JC83-6575-
(Judge David B. Dee) 
COMES NCW the Plaintiffs by and through their attorneys of record Lorin 
N. Pacef William B. Parsons III and G. Randall Klimt and request the Court to 
take the extraordinary step of allowing counsel for the Plaintiffs to address 
the Court relative to their Motion to continue the Motion for Summary 
Judgment in light of the fact that counsel for the Plaintiffs have only 
yesterday been appointed to the casef are without the opportunity because of 
the time constraints of having sufficient time to notice up a Motion in 
advance of the Motion for Summary Judgment of the Defendants, and represent 
that the Motion for a continuance is well founded and based upon the logic of 
that which is in the better interest of justice and the substantial legal 
reasoning that the case is not new ripe for Sunraary Judgment as represented 
in their arguments and documents on file herein. 
Counsel for the Plaintiffs regret the inability to properly notice a 
Hearing in conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure but request this 
extraordinary opportunity to address these issues with the Court at the time 
place and date set for Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment for the 
reasons above stated. 
DATED this (" day of , , 1984. 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI "£\PAFSONS 
. > 7 
By: ^ U ' t i w ) \ ^ - w > x j_<^ 
William B. Parsons III 
S571 
HfiND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Extraordinary Request for Review was hand delivered this lH day of 
, 1984, to: 
L.R. Gardiner Jr. 
POX, EDWARDS St GARDINER 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah , ,
 A 
LORIN N. PACE #2498 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS III #2535 
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFrlCi 
Salt Lake County Utan 
DEC 18 1984 
H. Dixjon Hiridley, Gierk 3rdDist. Court 
By —Srj'U'y-f>"v' 
Deputy Cierx 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-0O0-
DOWNTCWN ATHLETIC CLUB, ] 
a Utah Corporation ] 
Plaintiff, 
-vs- ] 
S.M. HORMAN, an individual, aka ] 
SID HORMAN, S.M. HQRMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S.M. HQRMAN ] 
& SONS COMPANY, ] 
Defendants. 
S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and Counter plaintiff, 
-vs-
DOWTCWN A3HLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
Corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH, ] 
an individual, 
Counterdefendants. ] 
I MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE 
£83^-5^ 
i Civil No.- C83^6575 • 
i (Judge David B. Dee) 
COMES NCW the Plaintiff by and through their attorneys of record PACE, 
KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS and moves the above entitled Court for an Order 
continuing Defendants1 Motion for Sumnary Judgment from November 16, 1984, at 
the hour of 8:30 a.m. until some further date in time as shall be mutually 
convenient to the parties or as shall be set by the Court. 
This Motion for a continuance is based upon the Affidavit of Lorin N. 
Pace submitted herewith and based upon the representation of counsel for the 
Plaintiff that they are, as of the 13th day of November, 1984, newly retained 
as counsel for the Plaintiff, that the case has considerable magnitude, 
considerable complexities, in that the Motion for Summary Judgment Memoranda 
provided by counsel for the Defendants is such that it can hardly be 
responded to in the short period of time between this date and the 16th day 
of November 1984 and that the case is not ripe for a Summary Judgment in that 
counsel for the Plaintiff have given notice to the Court of the intention to 
depose nine additional persons at least and require a reasonable period of 
time in which to complete those depositions and further counsel for the 
Plaintiff have given notice to the Court of their need for time to 
intelligently and legally proficiently respond to Defendants' Motion for 
Sumnary Judgment. 
DATED this . 3 day of *v $" , 1984. 
PACE, KLIMT, ERLI & PARSONS 
By:( /\f^<^~ 
"TiOrin N. Pace 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Motion for Continuance was hand delivered this /Q day of A(?( 
1984, to: 
L.R. Gardiner Jr. 
POX, EDWARDS & GARDINER 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
U 
f n th '.a (/i. KL-
LORIN N. PACE #2498 
WILLIAM B. PARSONS I I I #2535 
G. RANDALL KLIMT #1839 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
1200 University Club Building 
136 East South Temple 
Sal t Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
FILED >N CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
DEC 1 8 1984 
H Dfeo^maley Ofcik 3rd Onx Court 
By \ ,'tfy, \ . 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oOo-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
S.M. HQRMAN, an individual, aka 
SID HQRMAN, S.M. HORMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S.M. HORMAN 
& SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S.M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and Counterplaintiff, 
-vs-
DOWTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
Corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH, 
an individual, 
Counterdefendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL 
Civil NO.-CQ3 6575 » 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
J> 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, Lorin N. Pace, being first duly sworn do hereby depose and say that: 
1. I am lead counsel for the firm of PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI & PARSONS 
who has now been retained to represent the Dcwntcwn Athletic Clubf a Utah 
Corporation in the above entitled matter. 
2. I and my firm have new received majority of the materials held and 
maintained by prior counsel for the Plaintiff in this proceeding but have not 
had the opportunity of reviewing all of the materials and have only new in 
fact just obtained the pleadings and a portion of the depositions. 
3. We have not received critical depositions there having not been in 
the possession apparently of our predecessor counsel and have not had any 
opportunity to review or respond to the lengthy memoranda in support of the 
Motion for Summary Judgment produced by POXf EDWARDS & GARDINERf counsel for 
the Defendants in the above entitled proceeding. 
4. As a firm we are willing to proceed vigorously with the prosecution 
of this case, have no desire to delay the samef and desire only to provide 
our clients the best legal representation that we can, however, we find it 
physically impossible to intelligently and sufficiently respond to the Motion 
for Summary Judgment that J.s set for the 16th day of November 1984 at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. 
5. I would represent that I and iny firm would be capable of responding 
to the Motion for Sunmary Judgment readily within forty-five (45) days of the 
date set for the hearingf however, we anticipate the taking of nine (9) 
additional depositions including the depositon of Ray Gardiner Jr., of taking 
an additional or completing the deposition of Sid Horman, primary Defendant 
in these proceedings, and thus represent in this Affidavit that discovery is 
neither complete nor close to completion. 
As indicated we could respond to the technical issues in the Motion for 
Summary Judgment but we make no representation as to whether or not the 
discovery can be completed within said forty-five (45) days. 
Further the affiant saith not. 
DATED this /.^  day of fccd. , 1984. 
PACE, KLIMT^WNDERLI & PARSONS 
Lorm N. Pace 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this G day of NCAJ 1984 
tkj. fin if (niA 
My Commission Expires: 
i ruXU 
Nol&ry Public? 
3 -£ Ll- %1 Residing At: R L CB^JJ,
 i li-Ui 
HAND DELIVERY CERTIFICATE, 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and fore-
going Affidavit of Counsel was hand delivered this ^ day of AJ0\J 
1984, to: 
L.R. Gardiner Jr. 
FOXf EDWARDS & GARDINER 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Lorin N. Pace # 2498 
G. Randall Klimt # 1839 
William B. Parsons # 2535 
PACE, KLIMT, WUNDERLI AND PARSONS 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Counterdefendants 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB 
University Club Building, Suite 1200 
136 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-1300 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OP SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
S. M. HORMAN, an individual, a/k/a 
SID HORMAN, S. M. HORMAN & SONS, 
a Partnership, and S. M. HORMAN & 
SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, a Utah 
corporation, and DAVID G. YURTH, 
and individual, 
Counterdefendants. 
Civil No. C83-6545 
(Judge David B. Dee) 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
RICHARD CLISSOLD 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
Comes now the undersigned affiant, being first duly sworn under oath, 
hereby deposes and says as follows: 
1 
1. My name is Richard Clissold. I am a resident of Salt 
Lake City, Utah, and am the owner and sole proprietor of 
Clissold Investment Company which has numerous and diversified 
interests. 
2. In the late fall of 1980, I purchased ten lifetime 
charter memberships on a deferred payment contract in the 
Downtown Athletic Club. The proposed facility was to have been 
constructed on the site of the Harver Warehouse Building in 
downtown Salt Lake City. 
3. In the fall of 1981, I was asked by Mr. David G. Yurth, 
President of the Downtown Athletic Club, to assist him in the 
development of his project by participating as a co-maker and 
guarantor of his lease on the property. After having become 
acquainted with the project and with Mr. Yurth, I was 
satisfied that the proposed Athletic Club had sufficient merit to 
warrant my investigating the project as a possible investment of 
my own. 
4. Prior to my meeting with Mr. Yurth and with Mr. Horman, 
the lessor of the property, Mr. Yurth supplied me with numerous 
sets of documents describing the project, including blueprints, a 
copy of the contract between Mr. Horman and Downtown Athletic 
Club, a membership list, income and expense forecasts, market 
surveys, a feasibility study and a variety of other documents. I 
reviewed those documents, discussed them at length with Mr. 
Yurth, and subsequently agreed to provide whatever assistance I 
could to evaluate numerous financing alternatives which had been 
2 
proposed to complete the project. I also agreed to consider 
becoming a co-guarantor of the lease. 
5. In late September of 1981, I met in the offices of 
Horman Construction Company in Salt Lake City, Utah with my son 
Edward, Mr. Sidney Horman, and Mr. Yurth. During the course of 
that meeting Mr. Horman said that because of the engineering 
problems associated with the building and the rising interest 
rates, he was uncomfortable with the delays in building the 
athletic club. During the course of the meeting, we discussed 
the possibilty of assigning the master lease on the property to 
Downtown Athletic Club so that they could complete the athletic 
club project with their own resources, rather than Mr. Herman's. 
6. Mr. Horman said he was concerned about the structural 
integrity of the building and wanted additional engineering 
studies completed before assigning the lease. 
7. Mr. Horman further indicated that he was concerned 
about any continuing liability he would have for making payments 
to the owners of the property if he was to assign the lease to 
Downtown Athletic Club. We discussed a variety of alternative 
solutions to the problem. It was my understanding that Mr. 
Horman agreed to assign the master lease of the Harver Warehouse 
to Downtown Athletic Club if they could obtain their own 
financing for construction; if they could answer the engineering 
questions to the satisfaction of the City Building Department; 
and on condition that Downtown Athletic Club would agree to hold 
him harmless, and satisfy him with co-guarantors of the lease. 
8. In subsequent conversations with Mr. Yurth over the next 
two years, particularly in the fall of 1983, I was surprised to 
learn that Mr. Horman had refused to complete the assignment of 
the lease to Downtown Athletic Club after it had been confirmed 
to him that 1) financing was finally available to complete the 
project; 2) that the engineering requirements had been met; 3) 
and that the lenders had agreed to indemnify Mr. Horman as a part 
of the assignment of the master lease. 
9. I served for nearly two years as a member of the Board 
of Directors of Downtown Athletic Clubr from 1981 to 1983. 
During that time I found Mr. Yurth to be honest and truthful in 
all his dealings with me, and can attest without equivocation 
that he worked diligently to complete the project. 
Further the affiant saith not. 
DATED this day of Deceml 
^-^r^ . * .A/7 ' 
RICHARD Ci^SSOLD" 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this / u day of DecemEer, 
1984 
My Commission E x p i r e s : \6h ft VUIO)^ 2± LlJj^Uy/ I \ r _ Notary PUDIIC , , ; * 
7 {Q h^ Residing At: ,A/A H' kjUJ fyitiXH. 
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FILED IN CLBRK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
^ JAN 23 1985 
H frxon Hfndley. Ctark 3rd pest Court 
By . i • 
•j Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CLUB, 
: CIVIL NO. C-83-6545 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
S. M. HORMAN, et al., 
Defendants. 
The above-captioned matter came on before this Court on 
defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment, coupled with requests 
by the plaintiff for continuance on the grounds and for the 
reason that the counsel representing the plaintiff had withdrawn, 
and coupled with a subsequent letter from plaintiff individually 
representing himself, Mr. Yurth, that he was unable to get counsel, 
it has been continued because of the difficulties in securing 
counsel, giving counsel an opportunity to prepare the defense, 
and for other reasons, with final documents having been filed 
with this Court by plaintiff the 10th of December, 1984, and 
responsive documents having been filed with the Court December 
17, 1984. Requirements under Rule 56 that there needs be "genuine," 
"material" issues of fact raised by defendant on five grounds, 
and that the plaintiff has failed to meet the five grounds of 
the agreement between plaintiff and defendant, and for this 
reason plaintiff's case must be dismissed. The Court was required 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC 
V. HORMAN, ET AL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
because of the voluminous materials presented, some 70 pages 
and 23 cases requiring extensive Court time for reviewing and 
evaluation, thereby making it impossible for the Court to meet 
Rule 56 requirements of forthwithness, and the Court finds: 
1. That the defendants1 Motion to Strike the unsigned 
affidavits of some of the plaintiff's affiants should be granted. 
2. The Court finds that the portions of Mr. Yurth's affidavit 
based on hearsay and unsubstantiated facts should be stricken 
and defendants1 Motion is granted in that regard. 
3. Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
Dated this 23rd day of January, 1985. 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC 
V. HORMAN, ET AL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, postage prepaid, to the 
following this 23 day of January, 1985: 
Lorin N. Pace 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
136 E. South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. 
Attorney for Defendants 
57 West 200 South 
P. 0. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
7 
PrTc^i lCl!Xv>^ 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Counterplaintiff 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
P. 0. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3450 
Telephone: (801) 521-7751 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
-v-
S. M. HORMAN, and individual, 
a/k/a SID HORMAN; S. M. HORMAN, 
& SONS, a Partnership; and 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
S. M. HORMAN & SONS COMPANY, 
Defendant and 
Counterplaintiff, 
-v-
DOWNTOWN ATHLETIC CLUB, 
a Utah corporation, and 
DAVID G. YURTH, an individual, 
Civil No. C 83-6545 
(Judge David B. Dee^ 
ORDER 
and 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Counterdefendants. 
The defendants f Motion for Summary Judgment came on regularly 
for hearing, pursuant to notice, on November 16, 1984. The 
plaintiff was represented at the hearing by Mr. Lorin N. Pace, Mr. 
William B. Parsons III, and Mr. G. Randall Klimt, of the firm of 
Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons. Mr. L. R. Gardiner, Jr., and Mr. 
David B. Thomas, of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown, 
represented the defendants. 
At the hearing, plaintifffs counsel presented to the Court a 
motion to extend time for hearing on the motion for summary 
judgment and also presented a motion for extraordinary review, 
requesting that the motion to extend time for hearing be heard 
even though proper notice had not been given as required by the 
rules. Although neither of said motions was in the file before 
the Court and proper notice had nor been given, counsel for 
defendants indicated that although these motions had only been 
served upon him three and two days before the hearing, 
respectively, he had no objection to their being heard. The 
plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review was therefore granted 
and arguments were presented on plaintifffs motion to continue 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Noting that the 
plaintiff had had an extraordinarily long time for preparation for 
this hearing, the motion for summary judgment having been filed 
and served on July 19, 1984, and a substantial extension of time 
having previously been granted, and there being no adequate 
showing as to why the matter should be further continued, the 
-2-
t0l 
court denied the motion to continue the hearing but, after hearing 
arguments of counsel on the motion for summary judgment, did grant 
the plaintiff an additional twenty days within which to file a 
written memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment. 
The time for filing of a memorandum by the plaintiff would 
have expired on December 6, 1984, but an additional extension of 
time until December 10, 1984, was granted. Counsel for plaintiff 
did, however, file on December 6, 1984, a motion to compel the 
deposition of Mr. S. M. Horman and an affidavit of plaintiff's 
counsel in support of that motion. Defendants' counsel filed on 
December 7, 1984, a responsive affidavit. 
The plaintiff filed its Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
for Summary Judgment on December 10, 19 84, together with eight 
affidavits, two of which are unsigned and unsworn. Defendants 
timely filed a reply memorandum on December 17, 1984, together 
with a motion seeking an order to strike certain of the 
affidavits. 
Plaintiff's motion for extraordinary review, which was 
granted at the November 16, 1984, hearing and plaintiff's motion 
to continue hearing on the motion for summary judgment, which was 
denied at the November 16, 1984, hearing are hereby confirmed. 
There remain three motions for disposition by this Order and 
Summary Judgment: 
»3-
1. The plaintiff's "Motion to Compel Discovery" which seeks 
to take further deposition of defendant S. M. Horman; 
2. The defendants1 "Motion to Strike Affidavits"; 
3. The defendants1 "Motion for Summary Judgment." 
In rendering this order and judgment the following matters 
are particularly noted: 
The motion for summary judgment was filed and served by the 
defendants on July 19, 1984, and at that time a notice of hearing 
was also filed and served giving notice of hearing on August 28, 
1984, thereby giving 42 days notice of hearing. A memorandum and 
seven supporting affidavits were filed and served simultaneously 
with the motion. Thereafter, approximately one week before the 
scheduled hearing, Mr. B. Ray Zoll, who was then counsel for the 
plaintiff in this case, presented to the Court an ex parte motion 
for permission to withdraw as counsel and for extension of time 
for the plaintiff to obtain other counsel and to respond to the 
motion for summary judgment. The court granted that motion and, 
by written order prepared by counsel for plaintiff, granted 
plaintiff sixty days within which to obtain other counsel and to 
file a proper response to the motion for summary judgment. 
No appearance of counsel was made within the sixty-day 
period, and no response was filed to the motion for summary 
judgment. On October 26, 1984, the defendants served a notice 
pursuant to Section 36, Chapter 51, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, 
requiring the plaintiff to appear by counsel or in person. A 
-4-
notice of hearing was served on November 2, 1984, setting the 
motion for summary judgment to be heard on November 16, 1984. 
Prior to the appearance of Mr. Pace as counsel in this case, the 
court received from Mr. David Yurth a letter reciting, among other 
things, that he had contacted a number of law firms but had been 
unable to obtain representation. 
It is also noted that the deposition of plaintiff fs 
president, Mr. Yurth, was taken in this case on April 2, 1984, and 
that plaintiff took the deposition of defendant S. M. Horman on 
April 26, 1984. Plaintiff's taking of the deposition of Mr. 
Horman on April 26, 1984, appears to have been the last activity 
of the plaintiff in this case prior to the hearing on the motion 
for summary judgment and the entrance of the appearance of Mr. 
Pace three days before that hearing. 
The Court has necessarily taken more time than would be 
suggested by the mandate of Rule 56 that summary judgment, where 
appropriate, be granted "forthwith," because of the desire to give 
plaintiff ample opportunity to properly respond to the motion and 
because of the necessity to review the extensive memorandums and 
affidavits filed. Having now considered arguments of counsel, the 
affidavits, memoranda, and other pleadings, and having previously 
rendered a memorandum decision, this Order and Summary Judgment is 
now entered to formalize the rulings. 
-5-
In ruling upon the plaintiff's mction to compel discovery, it 
is noted that the deposition of Mr. Horman was taken in this case 
by previous counsel for plaintiff on April 26, 1984. Plaintiff, 
during the entire time that the motion for summary judgment was 
pending, made no further effort to take further deposition of Mr. 
Horman or to undertake any further discovery until the filing of 
various notices of taking depositions three days before the 
hearing on the motion for summary judgment on November 16, 19 84. 
The affidavit filed by plaintiff's counsel does not state any 
specific area of inquiry that is essential to a ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment or that is otherwise relevant to this 
action and which was not inquired into in the prior deposition. 
There is, therefore, no adequate showing that the Court's prior 
order denying plaintiff's motion for continuance should be 
altered, and there is no adequate showing that there is any 
information material to a disposition of the motion for summary 
judgment that has not previously been covered in the extensive 
deposition heretofore taken of Mr. Horman. The Court, having 
considered said motion and affidavits, hereby denies the motion to 
compel further deposition of Mr. Horman upon the ground that the 
motion is contrary to the previous order of the court denying 
continuance of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment and 
upon the ground that nothing in the motion or affidavit in support 
thereof shows any adequate grounds or basis for the granting of 
said motion. 
-6-
In ruling upon the defendants1 motion to strike certain of 
the affidavits filed by plaintiff, it is noted that the documents 
headed "Affidavit of Maurice Green" and "Affidavit of Grant 
Squires" are unsigned and unsworn, that the "Affidavit of David 
Yurth as to the affidavits of Grant Squires, Maurice Green and 
Todd Marx" is an improper affidavit seeking to introduce thereby 
the testimony contained in otherwise unsigned affidavits, and that 
the other affidavit of David Yurth contains conclusions of law, 
hearsay evidence, and other statements which would not be 
admissible in evidence. Even without defendants1 motion strike, 
said affidavits are not in accordance with the requirements of 
Rule 56(e) and therefore could not in any event be considered in 
ruling upon the motion for summary judgment. The Court, having 
considered the motion to strike and the affidavits to which it is 
directed, hereby grants the motion to strike, and the purported 
affidavits of Grant Squires and Maurice Green, the affidavit of 
David Yurth pertaining to the Squires and Green affidavits, and 
the portions of the affidavit of David Yurth to which the motion 
is directed are hereby stricken. 
Rule 56 requires that when a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported, as provided in the rule, which is the case 
here, the response must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a "genuine" issue for trial. Rule 56 requires judgment 
if there is no "genuine" issue as to "material" facts. The motion 
for summary judment has been amply supported, as provided in the 
-7-
rule, and shows that there can be no genuine issue that plaintiff 
has failed to comply with several conditions precedent in the 
agreements upon which plaintiff's complaint is based, and that the 
alleged oral agreement or modification fails to meet the 
requirements of the Statute of Frauds. The plaintiff's response 
has not shown that there is a genuine issue as to any material 
fact, and the motion for summary judgment must therefore be 
granted. There is no just reason for delay in entry of this 
judgment, and summary judgment in favor of defendants on 
plaintiff's complaint should be entered at this time. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
that the plaintiff's motion to take additional deposition of 
defendant Horman is denied; the defendant's motion to strike the 
affidavits of Maurice Green, Grant Squires, the affidavit of David 
Yurth pertaining to those affidavits, and the portions of the 
second Yurth affidavit specified in said motion is granted, and 
said affidavits and portions of the Yurth affidavit are hereby 
stricken; and summary judgment is hereby granted in favor of the 
defendants and against the plaintiff on the complaint in this 
action, and the complaint herein is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice and plaintiff shall take nothing thereby, and this 
judgment shall now be entered. 
DATED this (£> day of io^ary, 1985. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Order and Summary 
Judgment was served upon the plaintiff and counterdefendants 
herein by mailing a true and correct copy thereof to Lorin 
N. Pace, of the firm of Pace, Klimt, Wunderly & Parsons, 1200 
University Club Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this 
day of January, 1985. 
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